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Litigation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)1 has been the major growth area in the case law specific to
K-12 education.2 The bulk of the litigation under the IDEA concerns
the Act’s central pillar,3 the obligation of school districts to provide a
“free appropriate public education” (FAPE)4 to students with
disabilities,5 via an individualized education program (IEP).6 A
notable segment of this frequent litigation is the overlapping
* Perry A. Zirkel is university professor of education and law at Lehigh
University. He has a Ph.D. in Education Administration, a J.D. from the University
of Connecticut, and an LL.M. from Yale.
1

20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq. (West 2012). For the related regulations, see 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. (2012). Initially enacted in 1975 as funding legislation
under the broad title of Education of the Handicapped Act and the specific part
called the Education for All Handicapped Children’s Act, this law has undergone
major amendments during the reauthorizations in 1986, 1990, 1997, and 2004. See,
e.g., DIXIE S. HUEFNER & CYNTHIA M. HERR, NAVIGATING SPECIAL EDUCATION
LAW AND POLICY 43–49 (2012).
2
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education
Litigation: An Update, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011).
3
For this metaphor to characterize FAPE, see, e.g., Sytsema v. Acad. Sch.
Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The FAPE concept is the
central pillar of the IDEA statutory structure.”); cf. Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
675 F.3d 769, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The cornerstone of the Act is . . . that schools
provide children with a ‘[FAPE]’”); M.A. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d
335, 338 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The cornerstone . . . under the IDEA is the substantive
right of disabled children to a ‘[FAPE]’”).
4
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(9), 1412(a)(1) (West 2012).
5
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law under the IDEA, in IDEA: A HANDY
DESK REFERENCE TO THE LAW, REGULATIONS AND INDICATORS 669 (2012). The
issue typology of this annotated outline corresponds generally to the overall
classifications in special education law texts and topical indexes, but each one
represents notable variations of these overall themes depending on purpose, level,
and judgment. This source separates the category of FAPE from that of remedies,
i.e., tuition reimbursement and compensatory education, while expressly
acknowledging their integral overlap. In this compilation of IDEA case law, the
FAPE classification alone accounts for the majority of the decisions, and these
other two overlapping categories add to this majority.
6
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d) (West 2012). Because the IEP is the
operational vehicle for FAPE, courts often characterize it with the same metaphors.
See, e.g., White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 378 (5th
Cir. 2003) (“The cornerstone of the IDEA is the IEP.”); Hines v. Tullahoma City
Sch. Sys., Nos. 97–5103, 97–5104, 156 F.3d 1229, 1998 WL 393814, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 15, 1998) (“The IEP is the cornerstone of the Act.”).
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categories for the principal remedies for denials of this FAPE
obligation7—tuition reimbursement8 and compensatory education.9
Additionally, because the IDEA provides a comprehensive system of
administrative adjudication via impartial hearing officers (IHOs) and,
in states that have selected the statutory option of a second tier,
review officers (ROs),10 the body of pertinent case law extends to
IHO and RO decisions.11
7

Zirkel, supra note 5, at 677–709. For an early article providing an overview
of the basic IDEA remedies, with emphasis on the judicial level, see Allan
Osborne, Remedies for a School District’s Failure to Provide Services under IDEA,
112 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1996).
8
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2012);
Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. of
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985). For an empirical analysis of the
tuition reimbursement case law, see Thomas Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, Special
Education Tuition Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL &
SPECIAL EDUC. 350 (2001). For the comprehensive criteria and illustrative case law,
see Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition and Related Reimbursement under the IDEA: A
Decisional Checklist, 282 EDUC. L. REP. 785 (2012). In short, the steps in this
multi-part analysis are: (1) timely parental notice, (2) FAPE of the district’s
proposed IEP, (3) appropriateness of the parental placement, and (4) other equities
beyond timely notice. Id.
9
The statute does not expressly mention compensatory education, but the case
law has clearly established it under the Act’s grant of broad equitable authority to
adjudicators. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education: An Annotated
Update of the Law, 251 EDUC. L. REP. 501 (2010). For the analogy-based
relationship of compensatory education with tuition reimbursement, see Perry
Zirkel, Compensatory Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act: The Third Circuit’s Partially Mis-Leading Position, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 879
(2006). For the prevailing two approaches for determining the appropriate amount
of this remedy, which are generally referred to under the rubrics of “quantitative”
and “qualitative,” see Perry A. Zirkel, Two Competing Approaches for Calculating
Compensatory Education under the IDEA, 257 EDUC. L. REP. 550 (2010).
10
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(j) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507–300.518 (2012). The
number of states that have opted for a second tier has gradually dwindled to
approximately ten. Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems
under the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3, 5
(2010).
11
In addition to the state education agency websites that make these decisions
available, a national sampling, akin to the reporter series for federal and state court
decisions generally and in specialized subject areas, is available in the INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION LAW REPORT (IDELR) and in LRP Publications’
broader electronic database, Special Ed Connection.® For the overall picture of the
pertinent case law, see Perry A. Zirkel & Amanda C. Machin, The Special
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Under the landmark decision for FAPE, Board of Education v.
Rowley,12 the Supreme Court established a two-part test for
determining whether a school district met this central obligation
under the IDEA: 1) “has the [district] complied with the procedures
set forth in the Act?,” and 2) “is the [IEP] . . . reasonably calculated
to enable the child to receive educational benefits?”13 In interpreting
Congressional intent as emphasizing the first of these two sides, the
Rowley majority seemed to suggest strictness with regard to
procedural compliance14 and a relatively relaxed substantive
standard.15 In the hundreds of FAPE decisions after Rowley, the
lower courts confirmed and continued the relatively low substantive
standard for FAPE despite contrary scholarly commentary based on
the successive amendments to the Act.16 The Rowley lower court
progeny also developed a relaxed interpretation of its procedural side,
Education Case Law “Iceberg”: An Initial Exploration of the Underside, 41 J.L. &
EDUC. 483 (2012). In contrast, the coverage of this article does not extend to the
alternate and distinguishable enforcement avenue under the IDEA, the state
complaint resolution process. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brooke L. McGuire, A
Roadmap to Legal Dispute Resolution for Parents of Students with Disabilities, 23
J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 100 (2010) (differentiating the administrative from
the adjudicatory routes of dispute resolution under the IDEA as well as under
Section 504). The litigation concerning this other enforcement avenue is limited
and covered elsewhere. See Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for the IDEA
Complaint Resolution Process, 237 EDUC. L. REP. 565 (2011) (canvassing the
various primary available legal sources, such as IDEA regulations and U.S.
Department of Education policy interpretations, specific to the state complaint
resolution process).
12
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
13
Id. at 206–07.
14
See, e.g., id. at 206 (“We think that congressional emphasis upon full
participation of concerned parties throughout the development of the IEP . . .
demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the
procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress
wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.”).
15
This relaxed view is evident in (1) the Court’s equating the Act’s procedural
emphasis with access and its sketchy substantive standard with a “basic floor of
opportunity,” id. at 200–01, and (2) the Court’s concluding emphasis on deference
to governmental education authorities, id. at 208–09.
16
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Razed Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standard for
“Free Appropriate Public Education?”, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
397 (2008).
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amounting to another two-part test that connects the two sides: (1)
did the district violate one or more procedural requirements of the
Act, and, if so, (2) did the violation(s) result in loss of educational
benefit to the child?17
In the 2004 amendments to the IDEA, Congress codified this
procedural standard, with a possible per se exception for
“significantly imped[ing] the parent’s opportunity to participate in
the decision-making process regarding the provision of a [FAPE] . . .
to the parent’s child.”18 Finally, the courts have also established
another type of denial of FAPE19—insufficient implementation of the
IEP.20
The legal literature to date concerning the remedies for denials of
FAPE is largely limited.21 In the only article specifically and
17
See, e.g., Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2012); K.E. ex rel.
K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2011); L.M. ex rel. Sam M.
v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009); A.C. ex rel. M.C. v.
Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2009); Sytsema ex rel. Sytsema v. Acad. Sch.
Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2008); Hjortness ex rel. Hjortness v. Neenah
Joint Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 2007); Nack ex rel. Nack v. Orange City
Sch. Dist., 454 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2006); L.T. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm.,
361 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2004); Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist.,
328 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2003); DiBuo ex rel. DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 184
(4th Cir. 2002); Sch. Bd. v. K.C., 285 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2002).
18
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(II) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2) (2012).
19
Alternatively, this type may be regarded as one of two subsets on the
substantive side of FAPE—formulation and implementation.
20
See, e.g., Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App’x 968 (6th Cir. 2012);
Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2011);
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007);
Melissa S. ex rel. Karen S. v. Sch. Dist., 183 F. App’x 184 (3d Cir. 2006); L.C. v.
Utah State Bd. of Educ., 125 F. App’x 252 (10th Cir. 2005); Alex R. ex rel. Beth R.
v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2004).
21
Aside from the few specialized articles (supra notes 7–9), the bulk of the
scholarly commentary addresses IDEA remedies only incidentally. See, e.g., Elisa
Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin, & Steven A. Rosenbaum, How IDEA Fails Families
without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education
Lawyering, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107 (2011) (arguing for various
reforms in the private and public enforcement of the IDEA, including statutory
codification of the compensatory education remedy); Eloise Pasachof, Special
Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1413 (2011) (advocating greater public enforcement of the IDEA); Jon
Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special
Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (2011) (deconstructing three procedural
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comprehensively addressing IDEA remedies,22 Zirkel demarcated the
development of the Act’s broad adjudicatory authorization for “such
relief as the court determines is appropriate.”23 More specifically,
canvassing the case law, agency policy interpretations, and related
legal sources, he identified the major forms of injunctive relief
available to IHOs/ROs24 and courts for denials of FAPE,25 including:
(1) tuition reimbursement; (2) compensatory education; (3)
prospective revisions of the IEP; (4) prospective placement; and (5)
evaluations.26 In tracing the boundaries for this remedial authority,
the Zirkel article also recited the prevailing judicial view that

principles for decision-making under the IDEA); Michael Rebell, Special
Education Inclusion and the Courts, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523 (1996) (proposing a
“community engagement dialogic” model for resolving major educational
controversies, such as inclusion under the IDEA). The student law review articles
tend to be specific to a particular IDEA remedy and relatively superficial. See, e.g.,
Katie Harrison, Note, Direct Tuition Payments under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 25 J. CIV. RTS. ECON. DEV. 873 (2011) (advocating
remedy of direct, as alternative to reimbursed, tuition payment); T. Daris Isbell,
Note, Making Up for Lost Educational Opportunities: Distinguishing between
Compensatory Education and Additional Services As Remedies under the IDEA, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 1717 (2011) (confusing a New York review officer decision’s term
of “additional services” as a recognized and recommended remedy distinct from
compensatory education); Amy D. Quinn, Comment, Obtaining Tuition
Reimbursement for Children with Special Needs, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1211 (2012)
(recommending a purportedly useful template of four factors for deciding tuition
reimbursement cases, which do not square with the statute, regulations, or case
law).
22
Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2011).
23
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(c)(3) (2012).
24
The pertinent legal authorities treat the remedial authority of IHOs/ROs as
derived from and largely commensurate with the remedial authority of the courts.
Zirkel, supra note 22, at 8 n.29.
25
The denial of FAPE amounts to the basic form of remedy, which is
declaratory relief. Other remedies are specific to IDEA obligations that are
generally separable from FAPE denials. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Independent
Educational Evaluations at District Expense under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 223 (2009).
26
Zirkel, supra note 22, at 15–24. Other, more creative and controversial
remedies—sometimes included under the rubric of compensatory education—are
ordering training of district personnel or district hiring of consultants. Id. at 28–32.
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monetary damages are not available under the IDEA.27 Finally, the
typology for the present analysis identifies prospective services as a
separate remedy, although the Zirkel article treated it as ancillary or
subsidiary to IEP revisions and particular placements.28
In the absence of any published data on the remedies that
IHOs/ROs and courts determine after finding a denial of FAPE, the
purpose of this study is to provide a systematic analysis of the
pertinent case law. The specific questions are:
(1) What is the relative frequency of the various types of FAPE
violations?
(2) What is the relative frequency of the various IDEA
remedies?29
(3) For the most frequent remedies, does the distribution differ
markedly between IHO/RO and court decisions?30
(4) Do certain states have a particular propensity for the most
frequent remedies?31
(5) What has been the adjudicative disposition, or outcomes, of
these predominant remedies?32
27

Id. at 5 (citing, e.g., A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir.
2007); Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006); Ortega v. Bibb
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2005); Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d
478 (2d Cir. 2002); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000);
Thompson ex rel. Buckhanon v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 (8th
Cir. 1998); Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998); Charlie F. ex rel. Neil
F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996)).
28
Prospective services may be viewed as a more limited version and, thus,
subsidiary part of 1) what should have been in the IEP or what was in the IEP but
not implemented, or 2) what the child should receive as a placement as the result of
a denial of FAPE. However, the line between prospective and retrospective is far
from a bright one, especially given the blurry boundaries for compensatory
education. See, e.g., Mr. I v. Maine Sch. Admin. Unit No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 26 (1st
Cir. 2007) (fusing and confusing compensatory education with purely prospective
revisions to the IEP).
29
“Frequency” in this context is limited to instances where the remedy being at
issue, i.e., addressed by the IHO/RO or court, in the wake of a denial of FAPE.
Thus, the count does not include instances where the IHO/RO or court opinion
mentioned or discussed the remedy but did not rule on it.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Thus, here the conversion is from the remedy being at issue to its outcome,
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(6) Does any other, more qualitative33 trend emerge as notable?
I.

METHOD

Because it provides the broadest national sampling of IHO/RO
and court case law under the IDEA, Special Ed Connection®34 served
as the database for this study.35 The resulting sample selection
consisted of two steps. The first step was to screen all of the
decisions from January 1, 200036 to December 20, 201237 listed under
the following overlapping headings in the topical index: FAPE
Generally – 200.030; Procedural Violations as Denial – 200.035;
Reasonably Calculated to Provide FAPE – 200.040; Calculation of
Educational Benefit – 200.015; and Right to FAPE – 200.050.38 The
purpose of the initial review was to sift out the various cited
decisions where the HO/RO or court concluded that the defendant
district39 did not violate its FAPE obligations40 or otherwise did not
i.e., whether the IHO/RO or court granted, denied, or disposed of it otherwise in its
final order.
33
In this context, “qualitative” is simply in contrast to “quantitative,” although
recognizing the ultimate overlap of these two research approaches.
34
See supra note 11.
35
For the resulting citations provided infra, “IDELR” refers to the decisions
available in the hard-copy reporter series, whereas “LRP” refers to those decisions
available only in the electronic database. Moreover, following customary use,
citations to IHO/RO decisions are designated by “SEA,” because state education
agencies are responsible for providing the aforementioned (supra text
accompanying note 10) one- or two-tier system for administrative adjudications
under the IDEA.
36
The selection of this starting date provided for the most recent period of at
least a decade marked by the turn of the century.
37
The ending date was the time of the data collection. Thus, some of the cases
decided within the last few months of 2012 were not included in the sample due to
the time lag in publishing decisions. This limited incompleteness warranted a
projected figure for the final year in the frequency chart of Figure 1.
38
Although the overall topical heading “Free Appropriate Public Education
(FAPE)” included other subheadings, an exploratory sampling of each one revealed
that the cases where the IHO/RO or court found a denial of FAPE were already
included in the comprehensive coverage of the selected subheadings.
39
Although the usage consistently herein follows the customary plaintiffparent and defendant-district typology for IDEA cases, this user-friendly
characterization obscures nuances of adjudicative level, possible parent-child
differences (e.g., Winkelman v. Parma Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007)), and the
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find a denial of FAPE41 under the IDEA.42 The second step was
carefully reading and coding each of the remaining FAPE-denial
decisions in terms of two key variables.43 One variable was the type
of FAPE denial, using the following four categories:44
occasional case in this study’s sample where the district filed for the impartial
hearing.
40
The incidental finding—without specifically tallying the exact numbers—in
screening the decisions under these topical headings was that the FAPE decisions
in favor of districts clearly outnumbered those in favor of the parents. This trend
comports with that of a more systematic sampling of IDEA decisions. Zirkel,
supra note 5, at 677–709.
41
In some cases, FAPE overlaps with “child find,” the obligation to evaluate a
child reasonably suspected as qualifying for an evaluation and/or eligibility under
the IDEA, including compliance with the regulatory criteria for its timing and
scope. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Law of Evaluations under the IDEA: An
Annotated Update, EDUC. L. REP. (forthcoming 2013). Thus, the screening
included determining which cases to exclude as not fitting within this FAPE
overlap.
42
As a threshold matter, decisions under Section 504 or other legal bases were
excluded. See, e.g., Nixon v. Greenup Cnty. Sch. Dist., 890 F. Supp. 2d 753 (E.D.
Ky. 2012); Wiles v. Dep’t of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (D. Haw. 2008); Fox
Chapel Area Sch. Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 208 (Pa. SEA 2012). Second, cases that were
specific to FAPE but decided under the IDEA’s complaint resolution process were
excluded. See, e.g., Student with a Disability, 109 LRP 13190 (Mont. SEA 2009);
Student with a Disability, 45 IDELR ¶ 293 (Haw. SEA 2006); Shakopee Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 720, 45 IDELR ¶ 171 (Minn. SEA 2005). Third, decisions that were
specific to FAPE under the IDEA but inconclusive were excluded. See, e.g., D.F.
ex rel. N.F. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 F.3d 595 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanded to
district court for reconsideration); R.S. v. Montgomery Twp. Bd. of Educ., 59
IDELR ¶ 47 (D.N.J. 2012); Banks ex rel. D.B. v. District of Columbia, 720 F.
Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2010); Hunter v. District of Columbia, 51 IDELR ¶ 34
(D.D.C. 2008) (remanding to the IHO for final determination). Finally, the
exclusions also extended the various decisions under the IDEA limited to technical
adjudicative issues rather than the merits of FAPE. See, e.g., K.C. v. Bd. of Educ.,
48 IDELR ¶ 6 (D. Md. 2007) (additional evidence); A.H. v. State of New Jersey
Dep’t of Educ., 46 IDELR ¶ 252 (D.N.J. 2006) (exhaustion); Bd. of Educ., 46
IDELR ¶ 173 (N.Y. SEA 2003) (statute of limitations); Woodland Sch. Dist. 50, 36
IDELR ¶ 115 (Ill. SEA 2002) (mootness).
43
At this step, the relatively few cases that had more than one decision specific
to FAPE and its remedy, such as an affirmance, modification, or reversal upon
appeal, were limited to the final decision on the merits. For example, the report for
the IHO’s decision in McKinney Independent School District, 54 IDELR ¶ 33 (Tex.
2010) cross-referenced subsequent judicial decisions in the same case; thus, the
coding was limited to the court’s affirmance in S.F. v. McKinney Independent
School District, 58 IDELR ¶ 157 (E.D. Tex. 2012), magistrate’s report adopted, 59
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Procedural;
Substantive;
Implementation; and
Combination.45

The other variable was the type of remedy at issue and ruled upon
in the case, i.e., where the parent sought one or more of the following
forms of relief as an order from the IHO/RO or court.46 More
specifically, the typology of IDEA remedies for coding in this study
was follows:47


Tuition and related reimbursement48

IDELR ¶ 261 (E.D. Tex. 2012). Similarly excluded were decisions solely
concerning attorneys’ fees, which is not only a separable issue but also exclusive to
the court segment of the cases. Finally, where the IHO/RO or court opinion
addressed various issues, the coding was limited to the rulings specific to the
FAPE-denial and its remedy.
44
The coding also included a catchall “not ascertainable” category for the
relatively few cases where the IHO/RO or court opinion did not specify, either
explicitly or implicitly, the basis for the FAPE denial.
45
In these cases, the denial of FAPE was premised on separable procedural
and either substantive-formulation or substantive-implementation grounds (i.e.,
violations of each side of the two-part Rowley test, supra text accompanying note
13, or in combination with the implementation standard, supra text accompanying
note 20).
46
“At issue” here is purposely broad, referring to all FAPE-denial cases where
the IHO/RO or court expressly made a determination of the remedy, which may
have been to grant, deny, partially grant and partially deny, or remand (for either
further proceedings or to the IEP team) it.
47
All of these remedies are in addition to the basic declaratory relief that the
district has denied the child FAPE. Moreover, the first three of them tend to be
more retrospective, whereas the remaining three are more prospective, although
these chronological orientations are overlapping rather than mutually exclusive.
48
“Tuition and related reimbursement” is used herein for two reasons—one as
a general reminder and the other as a special consideration. First, per the model in
Zirkel, supra note 8, this remedy, which stems from the Supreme Court’s decisions
in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359
(1985), and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), is
generally understood to extend broadly to various expenses beyond or in lieu of
tuition, such as tutoring, related services, or assistive technology. Second, the issue
of reimbursement or payment for independent educational evaluations (IEEs) posed
a special consideration here. More specifically, the blurry boundary between these
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Compensatory education;49
Money damages;50
Prospective IEP revisions;
Prospective services;51 and
Evaluation.52

related remedies resulted in a special coding resolution. The broad category of
“tuition and related reimbursement” extended here to include the four IHO
decisions that treated the IEE issue as inseparably part of the FAPE denial. See,
e.g., Monrovia Unified Sch. Dist., 108 LRP 10494 (Cal. SEA 2008); Chicago Pub.
Sch., 44 IDELR ¶ 294 (Ill. SEA 2005). However, the coding excluded IEE
reimbursement or payment rulings where this relief was based on the parallel but
separable multi-part test, which is premised on the appropriateness of the
evaluation rather than the appropriateness of the IEP. For this separate test and
case law, see, e.g., Zirkel supra note 25; Perry A. Zirkel, Independent Educational
Evaluation Reimbursement: A Checklist, 231 EDUC. L. REP. 21 (2008).
49
The boundary for this remedy is also blurry, perhaps because it is still
evolving and has yet to receive Supreme Court or congressional clarification. For
purposes of coding, the coverage was broad, including cases where the IHO/RO or
court ordered some other relief, such as prospective placement, under the express
or at least implicit treatment as compensatory education. See, e.g., Pickens Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 2301 (Ga. SEA 2009) (ordering residential placement
expressly as compensatory education); Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist, 60 IDELR ¶ 59
(Tex. SEA 2012) (ordering, without labeling it as compensatory education,
continued private placement for a prescribed period in addition to tuition
reimbursement where parent requested both compensatory education and tuition
reimbursement).
50
Although unavailable in most jurisdictions now, this remedy was included as
a category in the data collection for the sake of completeness, especially given that
the precedents accumulated largely during this almost 13-year period. See supra
note 27. However, given its minimal frequency, it became part of the
Miscellaneous Other category in the reporting of the results. See infra note 64.
51
See supra note 26 and accompanying text. “Services” in this context is
broad, extending to personnel, such as an aide, and equipment, such as assistive
technology devices. See, e.g., Boston Pub. Sch., 59 IDELR ¶ 178 (Mass. SEA
2012). This category overlapped with compensatory education, which made it
difficult to distinguish the two, especially in cases where the written opinion did
not refer expressly to compensatory education. For example, New York review
officer decisions have blurred these two types of remedies under the term “added
services.” See, e.g., Student with a Disability, 50 IDELR ¶ 120 (N.Y. SEA 2008).
52
Similar to the exclusion or coding of IEE reimbursement, “evaluation” was
here reserved for decisions where the IHO/RO or court found a denial of FAPE and
ordered this remedy as part of the relief directly for this denial, not for some other,
separable reason. See, e.g., K.I. v. Montgomery Pub. Sch., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1283,
57 IDELR ¶ 93 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (ordering reevaluation for new IEP); Boston Pub.
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The resulting sample53 consisted of 224 decisions. Of these
decisions, 140 (63%) were at the IHO or RO level, with the
remaining 84 (38%) at the court level.54 Figure 1 shows the
frequency of these decisions per year, which approximates the rising
trajectory of special education and FAPE case law more generally.55

Sch., 59 IDELR ¶ 178 (Mass. SEA 2012) (ordering evaluation to determine new
IEP, including whether the child needed the prospective service of a 1:1 aide);
Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 19 (N.M. SEA 2001) (ordering evaluation
to determine not only IEP but also compensatory education). In a few of these
cases, typically premised on the IDEA’s child find obligation, the explicit finding
of a denial of FAPE was only marginal. See, e.g., Hawkins v. District of Columbia,
49 IDELR ¶ 213 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding denial of FAPE in upholding IHO’s order
for an evaluation to determine eligibility).
53
The reference to “sample” is based on the understanding that the population
consists of a larger number of decisions that either escape this rather broad net of
topical index categories or, inevitably, does not appear in this database. See Zirkel
& Machin, supra note 11, at 508–09. Although the size of the sample serves to
mitigate this limitation, representativeness remains an issue. See, e.g., Anastasia
D’Angelo, J. Gary Lutz, & Perry A. Zirkel, Are Published IDEA Hearing Officer
Decisions Representative? 14 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 241 (2004).
54
Rounding of decimals more than .5% accounts here and elsewhere in this
study for sums that are slightly more or less than 100%.
55
See, e.g., Zirkel & Johnson, supra note 2, at 5–6 (special education court
decisions); Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Special Education Case Law:
An Empirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. L. REP. 731 (2002) (special education
court and IHO/RO decisions); Perry A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process
Hearings under the IDEA: A Longitudinal Frequency Analysis, 21 J. SPECIAL
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 22 (2008) (special education IHO/RO decisions); Zirkel, supra
note 5, at 677–709 (FAPE court decisions).
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Figure 1.

The states where these cases most frequently arose were: (1) New
York—thirty-five (16%); (2) California—thirty-two (14%); (3)
Hawaii—twenty-two (10%); (4) Pennsylvania—nineteen (8%); (5)
New Jersey—thirteen (6%); (6) Texas—eleven (5%); and (7)
Alaska—ten (4%),56 again approximating the pattern for IDEA and
FAPE cases more generally.57
II.

RESULTS

The distribution of the FAPE violations for the 224 decisions
was, in order of frequency, as follows:
(1) Substantive—ninety-eight (44%);
(2) Procedural—eighty-two (37%);58

56

Thus, these seven states accounted for 63% of the 224 decisions.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The major exceptions were the
District of Columbia, which only accounted for eight (4%) of the cases in this
sample but is one of the top two jurisdictions for the IDEA and FAPE cases more
generally, and Alaska, which is in the lower group of jurisdictions for these cases
more generally.
58
Aligned with the recent codification (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2006) and
34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2) (2012)), the most common procedural violation was
denial of a meaningful opportunity for parental participation. See, e.g., D.B. v.
57
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(3) Combination—twenty-seven (12%);59
(4) Implementation—nine (4%); and
(5) Not ascertainable—eight (4%)60
Thus, substantive and procedural violations respectively
predominated, with insufficient implementation being the basis in
relatively few cases and with the particular basis for the denial of
FAPE being unclear in a similarly low proportion of the cases.
The distribution of the 294 “remedial rulings,”61 in order of
frequency of each type, is presented in Table 1. Because some of the
decisions had more than one remedy at issue,62 the proportional
frequencies varied in relation to the total number of remedial rulings
and decisions, respectively.63
Gloucester Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 10–4630, 2012 WL 2930226 (3d Cir. July 19,
2012); Dep’t of Educ., 55 IDELR ¶ 300 (Haw. SEA 2010); Acton-Agua Dulce
Unified Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 36 (Cal. SEA 2001).
59
Of these twenty-seven cases, twenty-three were based on the combination of
procedural and substantive-formulation grounds, and the remaining four were
based on the combination of procedural and substantive-implementation grounds.
60
In some of these cases, the basis was the overlapping issue of child find, but
without any indication of whether the adjudicator considered the denial of FAPE as
procedural or substantive. See, e.g., Scott v. District of Columbia, 45 IDELR ¶ 160
(D.D.C. 2006). The other cases in this limited category included decisions where
the district conceded the denial of FAPE, e.g., N.R. v. Dep’t of Educ., 52 IDELR ¶
92 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), or the adjudicator did not include sufficient information to
make this classification, e.g., San Dieguito Union High Sch. Dist. v. Guray-Jacobs,
44 IDELR ¶ 189 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
61
This term is used here to differentiate the ruling in the decision for each type
of remedy at issue. For the potential significant difference among various units of
analysis, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Caitlin A. Lyons, Restraining the Use of
Restraints for Students with Disabilities: An Empirical Analysis of the Case Law,
10 CONN. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 323, 337 (2011). Customizing the differentiated
model to the specific purposes of this analysis, the units are: 1) “decision,” which
here is the same as the case; 2) “remedial ruling,” which here refers to the
frequency of each type of remedy at issue in the decision (see supra note 29 and
text accompanying note 46); and 3) “outcome,” which refers to the adjudicator’s
disposition of the remedy at issue (see infra text accompanying notes 72–81).
62
The respective totals of 294 and 224 resulted in an average of 1.31 remedial
rulings per decision.
63
The second column in Table 1 presents raw frequencies, whereas the third
and fourth columns present the proportional frequencies in terms of the respective
frames of reference. Moreover, the figures in the final column add up to more than
100% due to the multiple remedies at issue in some of the decisions.
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Table 1. Frequency of Types of Remedies

Type of Remedy
Tuition and Related
Reimbursement
Compensatory
Education
Prospective IEP
Revisions
Prospective
Services
Prospective
Placement
Evaluation
Miscellaneous
Other64

Frequency

Proportion of
All Rulings
(n=294)

Proportion
of All
Decisions
(n=224)

n = 105

36%

47%

n = 88

30%

39%

n = 42

14%

19%

n = 24

8%

11%

n = 22

7%

10%

n=8

3%

4%

n=5

2%

2%

Table 1 reveals that the most frequent, or predominant, remedies
are (1) tuition and reimbursement and (2) compensatory education.
More specifically, tuition reimbursement accounted for almost half of
all the decisions and more than a third of all the remedial rulings,
while compensatory education accounted for an additional 39% and
30% of the decisions and rulings, respectively. The frequency of the
other types of remedies was at a markedly lower level.
For the two predominant remedies of tuition and related
reimbursement and compensatory education, Table 2 presents the
relative frequencies of rulings in the two successive adjudicative

64

For the decisions in this catchall category, see D.B. v. Gloucester Twp. Sch.
Dist., No. 10–4630, 2012 WL 2930226 (3d Cir. July 19, 2012) (denying
availability of money damages under the IDEA); Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P., 45
IDELR ¶ 253 (Alaska Super. Ct. 2006) (not specifying a remedy beyond
declaratory relief); Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR ¶ 223 (Ariz. SEA
2005) (upholding order for the district to re-do the manifestation determination
review); Warwick Sch. Comm., 36 IDELR ¶ 179 (R.I. SEA 2002); Klein Indep.
Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR ¶ 140 (Tex. SEA 2000) (ordering reinstatement of the
student).
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forums under the IDEA. Because some of the decisions only
addressed other types of remedies, the percentages do not add up to
100.65 Moreover, because some of the decisions addressed more than
one of these two remedies, the cells in each column are not mutually
exclusive.66
Table 2. Proportion of Predominant Remedies by Adjudicative
Forum

Adjudicative Forum
Court Decisions
(n=84)
IHO/RO Decisions
(n=140)

Tuition and Related Reimbursement

Compensatory
Education

52% (n=44)

39% (n=33)

44% (n=61)

39% (n=55)

This table shows that the courts face tuition and related
reimbursement more frequently than do IHOs/ROs,67 but these two
forums do not differ in their relative frequency of compensatory
education.68
For these two predominant remedies, Table 3 presents the relative
proportions for each of the seven most frequent states.69

65

The percentages here represent the number of remedial rulings for each of
these two types divided by the number of decisions in the respective forums, thus
corresponding for comparison purposes to the final column of Table 1.
66
This lack of independence precluded the use of inferential statistics (e.g., chi
square analysis) for comparison of the two forums.
67
This notable difference upon “eye-balled” examination is not necessarily
generalizable in terms of statistical significance.
68
The aforementioned (supra note 42) exclusion of the few IHO/RO decisions
that were subject to an IDELR-published judicial appeal, thus limiting the sample
to final decisions, serves as another cautionary consideration in this comparison.
69
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Table 3. Proportion of Predominant Remedies by State70
Most Frequent
States

Tuition and Related
Reimbursement
(45% of Decisions)

Compensatory
Education
(39% of
Decisions)

New York (n=35)

63% (n=22)

23% (n=8)

California (n=32)

38% (n=12)

41% (n=13)

Hawaii (n=22)

77% (n=17)

18% (n=4)

Pennsylvania (n=19)

32% (n=6)

89% (n=17)

New Jersey (n=13)

69% (n=9)

8% (n=1)

Texas (n=11)

36% (n=4)

55% (n=6)

Alaska (n=10)

30% (n=3)

20% (n=2)

Upon comparing proportions for the two types of remedies to
those for the total sample of decisions, Hawaii, New Jersey, and New
York appear to have a particular propensity for tuition and related
reimbursement; while Pennsylvania and, to a lesser extent, Texas
have a propensity for compensatory education.71
Whereas the foregoing analyses were based on the remedy being
at issue, the next table presents the distribution of outcomes, or
dispositions, for these two most frequent remedies—i.e., whether the
IHO/RO or court (1) granted the request fully, (2) granted it partially,
(3) denied it altogether, or (4) disposed of it inconclusively.72

70

The percentages for the two remedies columns in this table are based on the
number of rulings per type of remedy in each state as the numerator, and the
respective total number of remedial rulings for the state as the denominator.
71
This conclusion is purposely qualified in terms of “appears” because the
comparisons are not subject to inferential statistical analysis, see supra note 66, and
the cell sizes are limited—particularly for the last few states. Conversely, it
appears that the frequency was disproportionately low in Alaska for tuition
reimbursement, and in Hawaii, New York, and Alaska for compensatory education.
72
For the meaning of inconclusive in this context, see infra note 78.
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Table 4. Disposition of Predominant Remedies
Remedy
Tuition and
Related
Reimbursement75
(n=105)
Compensatory
Education76
(n=88)

Granted in
Full

Granted in
Part73

Denied

Inconclusive74

72 (69%)

16 (15%)

11 (10%)

6 (6%)

52 (59%)

15 (17%)

8 (9%)

13 (15%)

Table 4 reveals that the pattern is similar for both remedies.
More specifically, the plaintiff-parents were fully successful in more
or less than two-thirds of the decisions, partially successful in
approximately one-sixth of the decisions, and entirely unsuccessful in
approximately one-tenth of the decisions upon the denial of FAPE. 77
First, the higher full-success rate for tuition reimbursement

73
This outcome category included a few limited compensatory education
awards that were inferably only partial.
74
For compensatory education, this outcome category consisted of two
ultimately separable groupings: (a) those decisions reserved for further adjudicative
proceedings (e.g., Long v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2011)
(remanding to IHO)) to determine whether the plaintiff-parent was entitled to
compensatory education, and (b) those decisions delegated to the non-adjudicative
mechanisms (e.g., J.T. v. Dep’t of Educ., 112 LRP 28283 (D. Haw. May 31, 2012)
(ordering jointly paid IEE); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Syosset Sch. Dist., 101 LRP 699
(N.Y. SEA 2001) (remanding to IEP team to determine the amount of
compensatory education)). For tuition reimbursement, the category included the
occasional remand to apply one of the requisite steps to determine entitlement.
See, e.g., M.S. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2009); Mr. and
Mrs. M. ex rel. K.M. v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR ¶ 258 (D. Conn. 2007).
75
This category includes reimbursement for not only tuition in its narrow
sense but also related services, tutoring, and the relatively few IEE-at-publicexpense decisions. See supra note 48.
76
Similarly broad in scope, this category included rulings where the order was
in the form of other relief (e.g., prospective placement) that was reasonably
inferably intended as compensatory education. See supra note 49.
77
Without the inconclusive rulings, the proportions are even closer to each
other for the remaining three outcomes; for each of these two remedies, the
proportions are as follows:
 Tuition and related reimbursement:
72%
16%
11%
 Compensatory education:
70%
20%
9%
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corresponded to the higher proportion of inconclusive decisions for
compensatory education.78 Second, in several of these cases, the
fully or partially successful ruling for tuition reimbursement, or
compensatory education, was in a decision that provided for contrary
other rulings regarding FAPE issues and their remedies, thus
providing mixed outcomes overall and mitigating the meaning of
success.79 Third, the denials reflect not only the specific application
of the equities,80 but also non-automatic equation of denial of FAPE
with retrospective relief.81
Finally, in response to the final question of the study, 82 two
qualitative observations stand out. First is the notable lack,
especially but not exclusively in the decisions at the IHO/RO level,
of careful treatment in the remedies section of the written opinions of
these cases. In clear contrast with the factual findings and legal
conclusions with regard to denial of FAPE, the analysis of what relief
the parent is entitled to in terms of type and amount is in several
cases limited to a brief order. With the exception of tuition
reimbursement, systematic legal analysis, with applicable citations, is
more often than not absent.83 Second and as an interrelated matter, in
78

Specifically, the difference between the two remedies was 9% for each of
these outcome categories.
79
See, e.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012);
Larson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 361, 40 IDELR ¶ 231 (D. Minn. 2004); Anchorage
Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Alaska 2009); Morgan Hill Unified Sch.
Dist., 110 LRP 24090 (Cal. SEA 2010); Bridgewater-Raynham Reg’l Sch. Dist., 49
IDELR ¶ 88 (Mass. SEA 2007).
80
See, e.g., Dep’t of Educ. v. M.F., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Haw. 2011)
(remanding to determine based on enumerated equities).
81
See, e.g., Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 520 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2008) (assuming,
without deciding, that the authorities denied the child of FAPE but denying
equitable relief—in this case, compensatory education—in light of the student’s
truancy and, thus, lack of benefit).
82
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
83
See, e.g., Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 26 (Iowa SEA 2007), aff’d
sub nom. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Douglas L., 51 IDELR ¶ 15 (S.D. Iowa 2008)
(ending in cryptic order to provide extended school year as compensatory
education for extensive and detailed denial of FAPE affirmed upon judicial appeal
without any analysis of the remedial issue); Oktibbeha Cnty. Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR
¶ 57 (Miss. SEA 2002) (ordering compensatory education during summer for full
year denial of FAPE without explanation and citation); Rancocas Valley Reg’l Bd.
of Educ., 41 IDELR ¶ 46 (N.J. SEA 2004) (awarding unspecified amount of
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cases where there was no unilateral placement, the limitation of the
remedy to prospective relief was notable in the absence of any
consideration of compensatory education.84
III. DISCUSSION
Given its importance to not only the parent and child but also the
district in terms of both justice and cost, the remedy obviously merits
careful attention in the written opinions of IHOs/ROs and courts
under the IDEA. This limited study is merely exploratory, intended
to stimulate more systematic quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the remedial issue of not only FAPE but other issues under the IDEA,
such as child find, eligibility, and least restrictive environment.85
The first finding, which merely served as a transition to the
analysis of remedies,86 was that FAPE violations were largely, in
order of frequency, (1) substantive, (2) procedural, or (3) the
combination of these two types,87 which the Rowley Court originally
differentiated.88 Implementation is a more recent and infrequent
issue, likely because it is more obvious and, thus, subject to
resolution short of a final adjudicative decision, such as via
settlement. The predominance of substantive violations may seem at
odds with the procedural primacy of Rowley, but appears to be
compensatory education for identified period of denial of FAPE prior to unilateral
placement); Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist., 60 IDELR ¶ 259 (Tex. SEA 2012) (ordering
continuing placement at private school without explaining whether this prospective
component is compensatory education and how the IHO calculated it in relation to
the denial of FAPE).
84
Of the 119 decisions where tuition reimbursement was not at issue, almost
half did not consider compensatory, or retrospective, relief.
85
The corresponding study of remedies for claims under Section 504 and the
ADA, which are partially on behalf of students also covered by the IDEA and
which also extend to students only eligible under the broader definition of disability
under Section 504 and the ADA, also merits attention. Although not widely
understood, the adjudicative avenue for parents under Section 504 extends to the
IHO mechanism. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Public Schools’ Obligation for
Impartial Hearings under Section 504, 22 WIDENER L.J. 135 (2012).
86
In light of its limitations, this exploratory study did not extend to addressing
whether the frequency or outcomes of remedies differed according to the type of
FAPE violation.
87
See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
88
See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
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explainable in terms of the post-Rowley hybridization of the two
types89 and ultimate overlap between them.90
The second finding was that the most frequent remedies for
FAPE violations were (1) tuition reimbursement91 (47% of the
decisions) and (2) compensatory education (39% of the decisions).92
The first-place predominance of tuition reimbursement in these
FAPE-denial cases is not surprising in light of the relatively
longstanding and systematic criteria for this remedy, which includes
denial of FAPE as a key criterion93 and the high-stakes nature of this
remedy.94 Similarly, the lesser predominance of compensatory
89

See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
Akin to the mixed question of fact and law, which denial of FAPE ultimately
is, procedural and substantive are far from mutually exclusive in the world of
special education. For example, the lack or insufficiency of measurable goals, a
transition plan, and—at least where specified in corollary state special education
laws—a functional behavioral analysis or behavior intervention plan are not merely
procedural in terms of specified IEP ingredients but also substantive in terms of
reasonable calculation of educational benefit.
91
For economy of expression, the Discussion uses “tuition reimbursement,”
which is the customary label for this remedy, to represent what the earlier sections
of the Article refer to—as a reminder of the breadth and imprecision of its actual
scope—as “tuition and related reimbursement.”
92
See supra Table 1.
93
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006). This codification was put in place by
the 1997 Amendments of the IDEA, which in turn were attributable to the
successive Supreme Court decisions in School Committee of Burlington v.
Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359
(1985), and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
For a flow-chart-like canvassing of the criteria, see Zirkel, supra note 8.
94
Although some of these cases concerned lesser expenses, such as tutoring,
tuition at a rate of $90,000 for a year for a day placement and much more for a
residential placement are not difficult to find. See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist.
R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.6 (10th Cir. 2012)
(noting total cost of $9,800 per month for residential placement); R.E. v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting tuition of $90,000 per
year for day placement); C.L. ex rel. H.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 60 IDELR ¶
138 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting annual tuition of $125k for day placement). At the
outer extreme, a federal district court decision reported that as a result of an IHO
decision, Hawaii spent approximately $250,000 per year for each of two children
with autism, which inferably included private residential placement for each child.
Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 372 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (D. Haw. 2005), rev’d, 513 F.3d
922 (9th Cir. 2008). The resulting protracted litigation reportedly resulted in a $4.4
million settlement. Mary Vorsino, State to Pay 4.4 Million in Landmark
90
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education is in line with (1) its lack of recognition in the IDEA,95 (2)
its relatively recent and less completely crystallized state in case
law,96 and (3) its ready amenability in the wake of a FAPE-denial
when the parent has not unilaterally placed the child.97 Conversely,
the variety of other forms of relief fits with the broad equitable
authorization under the IDEA98 and the prospective implications of a
denial of FAPE.99
The third finding is that courts address tuition reimbursement
more frequently than IHOs/ROs do but that these two adjudicative
forums do not differ for the frequency of compensatory education
claims.100 The higher frequency for tuition reimbursement may be
due, at least in part, to the more immediate and direct high stakes
nature of this remedy, causing the increased likelihood of judicial
appeal of the IHO/RO ruling; more specifically, a tuition
reimbursement order is directly for a prompt lump-sum payment of
what may well be a relatively high amount, 101 thus being of major
concern for both the parent and the district.
In contrast,
compensatory education—although quite flexible and varied in
form102—is often in the form of services to be delivered over a
Settlement,
HONOLULU
STAR
ADVERTISER
(Aug.
29,
2012),
http://www.staradvertiser.com/s?action=login&f=y&id=167809065.
95
The legislation does not specifically mention this remedy, and the
regulations do so only via passing reference to “compensatory services” for the
alternate avenue of the complaint resolution process. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151(b)(1),
300.153(c) (2012).
96
See supra note 9.
97
First, unlike tuition reimbursement, compensatory education does not
require a second prerequisite hurdle in terms of the appropriateness of the parent’s
placement since there is none. Second, in the absence of a unilateral placement,
compensatory education would appear to be the default remedy in terms of
retrospective relief.
98
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
99
When an IHO/RO or court concluded that the district has not provided
FAPE in the requisite specific terms of procedural, substantive, and/or
implementation violations, the district has the basis and incentive for correcting the
problem in the future to avoid further noncompliance and its costly consequences.
Even in cases where the sole remedial issue is tuition reimbursement or
compensatory education, which are retrospective, the prospective effect is implicit.
100
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
101
See supra notes 91 and 94.
102
See Zirkel, supra note 9, at 508–09.
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relatively indefinite or protracted period.103
The fourth finding is that the states of Hawaii, New Jersey, and
New York appear to have a particular propensity for tuition and
related reimbursement, while Pennsylvania and, to a lesser extent,
Texas, have a particular propensity for compensatory education.104
Part of the tuition reimbursement propensity among these states may
well be a reflection of their high special education litigation rates.105
Another possible contributing factor is systemic dysfunction in terms
of providing appropriate special education services in the state as a
whole106 or in population centers in these states.107
For
compensatory education, the likely reasons for the particular
103

See, e.g., Bell v. Bd. of Educ., 52 IDELR ¶ 161 (D.N.M. 2008) (ordering
tutoring and other educational assistance of fifteen hours per week for fifteen
months); Bakersfield City Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR ¶ 142 (Cal. SEA 2008) (ordering
one hour of social skills training per week for 12 months); Elizabethtown Area Sch.
Dist., 50 IDELR ¶ 24 (Pa. 2008) (affirming compensatory education award of 720
hours presumably during student’s remaining period of eligibility).
104
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
105
Perry A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process Hearings under the IDEA:
A Longitudinal Frequency Analysis, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 21, 31
(2008) (finding that the states with the highest number of IDEA hearings in relation
to their special education enrollments were New York, New Jersey, and Hawaii).
106
See, e.g., Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2008)
(characterizing Hawaii, including a 1994 consent decree, as having “long struggled
to provide adequate services to special needs students in compliance with state and
federal law”).
107
See, e.g., Amanda M. Fairbanks, Tug of War Over Costs to Educate the
Autistic,
N.Y.
TIMES
(April
18,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/education/19autism.html?_r=0 (reporting that
cost of special education students’ private school tuition to New York City's school
district increased from $57.6 million in 2007 to $88.9 million in 2008); Pam
Belleck, Public Pays for the Learning-Disabled to Attend Private Schools, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/27/nyregion/public-paysfor-the-learning-disabled-to-attend-private-schools.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
(reporting that increasing number of parents in New York City are bringing and
winning tuition reimbursement claims, reflecting in and contributing to the school
system's weaknesses). Conversely, the high availability and use of private schools
for special education placement may be a contributing factor in New Jersey. See,
e.g., Data Tables for OSEP State Reported Data – Table B3-2 (2011), INDIVIDUALS
WITH
DISABILITIES
EDUCATION
ACT
(IDEA)
DATA,
https://www.ideadata.org/arc_toc13.asp#partbLRE (last visited Mar. 28, 2013)
(showing that New Jersey as the state with the highest percentage of parental
private placements).
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propensity in certain states is more difficult to divine, but it may be
due in part to the relaxed jurisdictional standards for compensatory
education.108 However, these findings and their explanations are
only tentative, because the analysis was limited to the seven most
frequent states for these remedies, and the cell sizes for the lower half
of them (e.g., Texas) were quite small.109
The fifth finding is that the parents were fully successful in the
clear majority of the rulings for both of these remedies, with the
difference in favor of a higher proportion for tuition reimbursement
matched by the higher percentage of inconclusive rulings for
compensatory education.110
As a moderating threshold
consideration, because the remedy is a consequential component of
the overall issue of FAPE, these outcomes results are skewed.111
More specifically, due to the integral overlap of these two remedies
and denial of FAPE, the majority in favor of parents for tuition
reimbursement or compensatory education is actually a minority in
favor of parents in terms of their overall claim. Viewed alternatively,
because denial of FAPE is an essential element of the test for tuition
reimbursement or compensatory education,112 the outcomes of the

Compare M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396 (3d
Cir. 1996) (requiring only a more than de minimis denial of FAPE), with Mrs. C. v.
Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring a gross denial of FAPE). Other
factors must also be significant and interacting, because (1) in contrast with
Pennsylvania’s relatively high proportion of compensatory education rulings, New
Jersey, the other Third Circuit decision in this analysis, had a relatively low
proportion of such rulings, and (2) the standard in New York has become more
unsettled and relaxed during the period of this study, see e.g., P. ex rel. Mr. P v.
Newington Bd. of Educ., 512 F. Supp. 2d 89, 112 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 546 F.3d
111 (2d Cir. 2008) (interpreting the gross denial standard to apply only in cases
where the student is beyond age twenty-one).
109
Additionally, a more comprehensive and intensive follow-up study would
allow for examining the frequency and outcomes of the other types of remedies,
which may have an interactive effect with tuition reimbursement and compensatory
education.
110
See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
111
These interpretations are tentative, depending on the intervening
consideration of the typology of issues (supra note 5) and the units of analysis
(supra note 61).
112
Although the multi-part of decisional framework of tuition reimbursement
more obviously includes denial of FAPE, the analogous and more direct analysis
for compensatory education encompasses the same foundational ingredient. See
108
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cases where parents sought either remedy are different and less
favorable to the notable extent that the ruling is in favor of districts in
the clear majority of the higher number of cases classified under
FAPE.113 Given this restriction, the majority proportion in favor of
parents for both remedies is not surprising, especially in light of the
relatively relaxed standard for the second appropriateness step for
tuition reimbursement114 and the aforementioned115 absence of any
corresponding prerequisite for compensatory education. Similarly,
the notable minority of partially granted/partially denied requests for
tuition reimbursement and compensatory education, which
approximates one-sixth of the rulings for each remedy, fits with their
clearly equitable nature.116 Finally, the lower parent-favorable
proportion for compensatory education rulings, as compared with
tuition reimbursement, is not surprising given its higher proportion of
inconclusive rulings, i.e., where the adjudicator delegates the
determination to further proceedings or processes.117
The final findings, in the form of qualitative observations, were
that in the cases for the remedies other than tuition reimbursement 1)
the written treatment was often far from thorough, and 2) the
exclusive use of purely prospective remedies was more frequent than
expected.118 These interrelated observations suggest the need for

supra notes 8–9.
113
See supra note 40. The number of FAPE cases is sufficiently higher to
infer that the overall majority is in favor of districts, but the specific proportions
would require tabulating a combination of the FAPE with the tuition
reimbursement and compensatory education categories, which is not available in
the literature to date.
114
Per the multi-part test outlined, supra note 8, this step refers to the parents’
unilateral, as contrasted with the district’s proposed, placement. For the
comparatively relaxed standard, see, e.g., Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7 (1993); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2012).
115
See supra note 97.
116
This equitable nature is based not only on the overall broad remedial
authorization in the IDEA (supra note 23 and accompanying text) but also the
express equities elements in the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s tuition
reimbursement analysis (supra note 8) and the judicial recognition of compensatory
education as an analogous remedy (supra note 9).
117
See supra note 78.
118
See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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improvement.119
For example, when the aforementioned120
delegation of compensatory education was to IEP teams, the
adjudicator often ignored the relatively strong case law authority
against doing so.121
Similarly, the failure of these IDEA
adjudicators, particularly the IHOs/ROs, to identify and apply the
case law concerning the standards for compensatory education more
generally122 and the boundaries for the their remedies, such as
prospective placement,123 is in stark contrast to the review norm of a
“thorough and careful” opinion.124 Yet, the limits of improvement

119

Other remedial issues warrant systematic study and careful consideration
among scholars and adjudicators. For example, a leading consultant-trainer has
suggested that the prospective order of the IHO/RO, upon finding a denial of
FAPE, should specify what the new IEP must include to rectify its identified
deficiencies. For this purpose, he recommended that the IHO during the prehearing
process have the parties clarify the remedy issue and forewarn them of the need for
an evidentiary record as its basis. Interview with Lynwood Beekman, Director,
Special Education Solutions, in Albany, N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2013). For an analogous
suggestion, another leading expert on IDEA dispute resolution included in his
proposal for a binding arbitration alternative the recommendation that the decision
be in the form of a good IEP. S. James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for An Alternative
Dispute Resolution Procedure, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 361, 374
(2012).
120
See supra text accompanying note 117.
121
Bd. of Educ. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 317–18 (6th Cir. 2007); Reid ex rel.
Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (ruling, based on
the impartiality and finality requirements, that IHOs/ROs may not delegate to the
IEP the decision to discontinue or terminate the compensatory education award).
This case law might be distinguishable as either being specific to jurisdictions that
follow the qualitative approach or as being limited to termination or reduction, as
per T.G. v. Midland Sch. Dist. 7, 848 F. Supp. 2d 902 (C.D. Ill. 2012), although the
original rationale in Reid would seem to exceed such attempted boundaries. Cf.
Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Alaska 2009) (reversing the
part of the IHO’s order delegating approval authority to private provider for new
IEP); Slack v. Del. Dep’t of Educ., 826 F. Supp. 115, 121–22 (D. Del. 1993)
(ruling that decision that left the resolution to “a mechanism for evaluating the
effectiveness of whatever private placement is utilized” violated the finality
requirement). In any event, such careful consideration is largely missing in the
cases in this study’s sample.
122
See supra note 9.
123
See Zirkel, supra note 22, at 10 (citing Davis v. District of Columbia Bd. of
Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (D.D.C. 1982).
124
See, e.g., M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 241 (2d Cir. 2012);
Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012). For a more

240

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-1

are not only systemic but also structural. More specifically,
IHOs/ROs in many states face systemic limits in terms of either
compensation or specialization,125 and they face a challenging time
limit.126 For courts, the presence of congestion and the lack of
specialization are obvious. Structurally, both IHOs/ROs and courts
are largely reactive mechanisms, which are largely dependent on the
parties’ action and which have limitations on raising issues or
ordering relief sua sponte.127 The lack of attorneys with special
expertise in IDEA cases in many parts of the country128 and the
expanded permissibility of pro se representation by parents129
contribute to the less than complete and optimal use of compensatory
education.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the parties in a FAPE case, if the adjudicator determines that
the district has violated the applicable standards for denial, the most
significant part of the decision is the explanation and expression of
the remedy. For the parent, it represents closure in terms of equitable
justice that provides appropriate relief not only prospectively but also

detailed view of the norms for IHO/RO decision-making, see Perry A. Zirkel,
“Appropriate” Decisions under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 33
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 242 (2013). For the case law setting for the
standards specific to compensatory education awards, see id. at 259 nn.75–76.
125
Although there is an occasional exception, the part-time IHOs tend to have
limited compensation, and the full-time IHOs/ROs tend to have such varied and
broad jurisdiction that counters specialization in IDEA issues. See, e.g., Zirkel &
Scala, supra note 10, at 6.
126
34 C.F.R. § 300.515 (2012) (45 days for IHO and 30 days for RO except for
specific extensions in response to party request).
127
See Zirkel, supra note 22, at 11–14. The identified case law is specific to
IHOs/ROs but also at least inferably applies to courts based on their institutional
structure.
128
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Lay Advocates and Parent Experts Under the
IDEA, 217 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 21–23 (2007); Kay Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the
Matter of Arons: Construction of the IDEA's Lay Advocate Provision Too Narrow
9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 193, 219–203 (2002).
129
Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516
(2007).
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retrospectively.130 For the district, it represents the corresponding
consequences in terms of both equity and expense. Yet the
systematic investigation and improvement of the remedial orders at
both adjudicative levels under the IDEA, with special but not sole
attention to the evolving efficacy of IHOs/ROs,131 have yet to receive
adequate attention. This exploratory study is intended to stimulate
more thorough and thoughtful efforts in this direction.

130

Although implementation of the order is obviously in the future, the denial
was in the past (possibly, depending on the circumstances since the initial filing,
continuing to the present). Thus, the use of “prospectively” and “retrospectively”
in this context respectively refer to fixing the child’s IEP for the period subsequent
to the order and compensating the child for the period previous to the order.
131
Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping
Judicialization of Special Education Hearings: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007).

